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WEAPONIZA TION OF SPACE
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE THE DAWN of the satellite age with Russia's Sputnik 1in 1957 and the launch of the first communications satellite,
Telstar-1, five years later,' humanity has gradually but undeniably
become dependent on satellite communications systems to
maintain global economic, military, and informational links be-
tween nations.2 Indeed, in an era where instantaneous interna-
tional communication is the norm, satellites have become vital
instruments for the maintenance of peace and stability.3 Con-
current with these peaceful developments, ever-more powerful
military satellites are today facilitating the prolific use of un-
manned combat drones for tactical air strikes and dramatically
increasing the degree of global spy surveillance.' It is not sur-
prising, then, that rapid advances in technology are leading
countries to develop anti-satellite (ASAT) missile weapons sys-
tems, ground-based ASAT disruptive lasers (non-kinetic-kill sys-
tems),5 and low-Earth-orbit, space-based drone bombers.' The
widespread use of drone weapons and the potential use of ASAT
weapons in future wars has necessitated scrutiny of how interna-
tional humanitarian law (IHL) applies to the ongoing
weaponization of space and the high-tech nature of combat in
the twenty-first century.
II. THESIS
This article argues that the use of ASAT missile weapons and
potential use of space-based drone bombers in combat will se-
verely impede the ability of countries to comply with IHL and
will increase civilian losses in conflicts. This article also argues
that these weapons systems are more akin in nature to weapons
of mass destruction (WMDs) and therefore should be treated as
such. First, the author argues that the proportionality and dis-
tinction considerations set out under Additional Protocol I of
I See SPACESECURITY.ORG, SPACE SECURITY 2011, at 78, 98 (2011), available at
http://www.spacesecurity.org/space.security.2011.revised.pdf.
2 See MICHAEL KREPON & CHRISTOPHER CLARY, SPACE ASSURANCE OR SPACE Dom-
INANCE? THE CASE AGAINST WEAPONIZING SPACE 105 (2003).
3 See id. at 59-60.
4 See David A. Koplow, ASAT-isfaction: Customary International Law and the Regu-
lation of Anti-Satellite Weapons, 30 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1187, 1191-92 (2009).
5SPACE SECURITY 2011, supra note 1, at 25.
6 See Tom Burghardt, The Militarization of Outer Space: The Pentagon's "Space War-
nors", GLOBAL RES. (May 9, 2010), http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-militariza-
tion-of-outer-space-the-pentagon-s-space-warriors.
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the Geneva Convention (Protocol I)7 are difficult to determine
when using ASAT weaponry. Second, the author argues that
ASAT weaponry, when used in conjunction with coordinated
cyber-attacks, has the potential to rapidly cripple vital civilian
infrastructure and thus harm civilian populations, making the
military necessity of ASAT attacks questionable under IHL. Fi-
nally, the author argues that while the development of ASAT
weapons is a natural by-product of a world dependent on satel-
lite-based communications systems, the use of ASAT weapons in
warfare would have a destabilizing effect by encouraging nations
to violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty (OST) in the pursuit of
developing space-based WMD systems. As such, this article
presents the case for the international community to establish a
treaty prohibiting the use of ASAT missiles and space weapons-
a treaty similar in nature to the Chemical Weapons Conven-
tion-in order to outlaw the use of offensive and defensive
ASAT weapons systems and space-based conventional drone
bombers.
III. ROADMAP
First, in framing a discussion on ASAT weapons systems, the
predominance of satellite usage around the world will be as-
sessed to underscore the criticality of satellites to global stability.
Next, existing ASAT and space weapons systems will be ex-
amined to provide an understanding of the nature of their
threat to IHL and the threat posed by space debris. This tech-
nology will then be examined in light of sources of international
law relating to weapons in outer space, particularly the OST and
sections of IHL found in Protocol I. As a comparative analysis,
the customary international law with respect to chemical weap-
ons will then be assessed to highlight how ASAT weapons could
become universally conceptualized as an unacceptable form of
warfare. This will serve to characterize ASAT missiles and space
weapons as "weapons of mass destruction" under the scope of
IHL, which will facilitate public discourse on the threat of space
weapons to civilians.
7 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relat-
ing to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
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IV. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
The OST prohibits the placement of WMDs in Earth's atmos-
phere but, critically, does not prohibit the use or placement of
conventional weapons in space.' Over the past five years, both
China and the United States have tested ASAT missile weapons,
respectively targeting and successfully destroying aging satellites
located hundreds of kilometers above Earth.' Both of these
states-along with India, Japan, and France-are alleged to
have either developed the same ASAT missile deterrent capacity
or possess the technological means to quickly produce this ca-
pacity (but have yet to test such a weapon).xo
It is outer space-both with respect to human ambition and
the application of IHL-that is indeed the "final frontier.""1 Just
how the international community approaches the serious legal
issues that are emerging from this new field of IHL will deter-
mine the very future of warfare, humanity's use of space, and
the nature of global peace and stability.
A. GLOBAL PROLIFERATION OF SATELLITES AND EXPONENTIAL
VULNERABILITY
Satellites have become a vital piece of infrastructure for a wide
spectrum of daily life-particularly in the context of military op-
erations and war. Global positioning systems (GPS), interna-
tional handheld telecommunications, and high-speed global
data transfer-all facilitated by exponentially more advanced
spy and communications satellites-have inalterably changed
the nature of combat and intelligence dissemination." The sat-
ellite-linked globalized economy is currently more intercon-
nected, interdependent, and intricately intertwined than at any
other time in human history;" at the same time, it is more vul-
8 See Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies art. IV,
Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty].
9 See SHIRLEY KAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., RS22652, CHINA'S ANTI-SATELLITE
WEAPON TEST (2007); Michael W. Taylor, Trashing the Solar System One Planet at a
Time: Earth's Orbital Debris Problem, 20 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REv. 1, 10 (2007);
SPACE SECURITY 2011, supra note 1, at 25.
10 See David R. Sands, China, India Hasten Arms Race in Space; U.S. Dominance
Challenged, WASH. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at Al.
11 Id. (alluding to the iconic Star Trek introductory narrative).
12 See SPACE SECURITY 2011, supra note 1, at 25.
13 See Robert G. Joseph, Under Secretary for Arms Control & Int'l Sec., Re-
marks on the President's National Space Policy-Assuring America's Vital Inter-
ests (Jan. 11, 2007), available at http://2001-2009.state.gov/t/us/rm/78679.htm.
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nerable to attack than ever before. This is particularly true in
the context of emerging weapons systems like ASAT missile sys-
tems, which are specifically designed to target and destroy the
very technology-satellites-that are literally connecting the
world.
In the United States, "[s]atellites now function as essential
links in . . . 'critical infrastructure"' and, furthermore, play a
vital economic role with over "1100 corporations now ex-
ploit[ing] space in one way or another."" "Kazakhstan recently
became the forty-seventh nation to undertake its own civilian
space activities."' 5 Notwithstanding the recent global economic
downturn, the proliferation of space and satellite technology is
unlikely to abate any time soon; global commercial space reve-
nues now exceed $168 billion per year.1 6 The value of direct
U.S. investment in outer space is set to "soon reach half a trillion
dollars, rivaling the size of U.S. capital investment in Europe.""
The most recent statistics available indicate that approximately
1,071 operational satellites now orbit the Earth in an increas-
ingly congested array," particularly in routes deemed "most
favorable" for commercial operations. Given the exponential
growth of smartphone use globally, satellites will continue to
proliferate; similarly, the criticality of satellites to daily life will
continue to grow for more people all over the world.
B. ASSESSING THE THREAT OF ASAT WEAPONS: STATISTICS AND
U.S. POLICY
In consideration of the centrality of satellites to modern life,
some numerical statistics emphasize the emerging threat posed
by ASAT weapons. According to the latest available assessments,
14 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1190-91; see alsoJohn E. Hyten, A Sea of Peace or a
Theater of War: Dealing with the Inevitable Conflict in Space, ACDIS OCCASIONAL PA-
PER 7 (2000), http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/apj/apj02/fal02/
hyten.html.
15 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1191; see also SPACE SECURTY 2011, supra note 1, at
77.
16 SPACE SECURITY 2011, supra note 1, at 92 (claiming satellite industry revenues
exceeding $168 billion in 2010); Koplow, supra note 4, at 1191 (claiming global
space revenues exceeding $140 billion per year in 2009).
17 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1191.
18 UCS Satellite Database, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTs, http://www.ucsusa.
org/nuclear weapons-and-global-security/space-weapons/technical-issues/
ucs-satellite-database.html (last updated Sept. 13, 2013).
19 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1191.
744 [ 78
WEAPONIZA TION OF SPACE
the major world powers operate the following numbers of
satellites:
* United States: Currently has 459 satellites in orbit, with 131
"known" military satellites and 117 used for other govern-
ment purposes.
* China: Currently has a total of 105 satellites in orbit.
* Russia: Currently has a total of 110 satellites in orbit.
* Rest of the world: Currently operates a total of 397 satellites,
significantly fewer than the United States alone operates.2 0
While the specific functions of military satellites are often highly
classified, the nature of satellites in orbit is such that their orbi-
tal paths cannot be kept secret once they are launched.2 1 This
"exposed" reality means that nations' satellites are equally un-
protected in space and thus vulnerable to attack by ASAT weap-
ons.2 2 This is an important strategic reality that must be
remembered throughout this assessment of how ASAT weapons
systems impact the application of IHL. While some countries,
such as the United States, possess a numerical advantage in
terms of their total orbiting satellite population, this exposure
means that those countries' infrastructures are arguably more
open to ASAT or space-based weapons attack.
In light of this reality, the New York Times reported in 2005
that General Lance W. Lord, then-Commander of the U.S. Air
Force Space Command (AFSPC), told an Air Force conference
that "'[s]pace superiority is not our birthright, but it is our
destiny. . . . Space superiority is our day-to-day mission. Space
supremacy is our vision for the future.'" 2 3 This provocative statement
acknowledges the simple fact that the United States controls the
overwhelming majority of satellites in orbit around Earth. When
combined with the world's increased reliance on satellites, the
statement by General Lord also raises questions about how
other countries intend to protect such vital pieces of their na-
tional infrastructure. To accomplish the goal of space
supremacy, the United States created the AFSPC in 1982 as a
distinct entity (one that is separate in control from the Air
20 UCS Satellite Database, supra note 18.
21 See Koplow, supra note 4, at 1200.
22 Id.
23 Tim Weiner, Air Force Seeks Bush's Approval for Space Weapons Programs, N.Y.
TIMES (May 18, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/18/business/18space.
html (emphasis added) (quoting General Lance W. Lord).
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Force) in recognition of the unique operational requirements
of outer space.2 4
C. COMPOSITION OF ASAT WEAPONS SYSTEMS
In a detailed examination of ASAT weapons and their poten-
tial implications for customary international law, David Koplow
explains in easy-to-understand detail the main types of ASAT
weapons and how they work, stating:
The first is "kinetic energy" interceptors, relying on a physical
object that suddenly shoots up from [E]arth and either collides
with the target satellite, destroying it via high-speed impact, or
approaches closely enough to blow up both itself and the target
via a suicidal explosion.
The alternative ASAT technology relies instead on "directed
energy," such as a laser beam, a column of sub-atomic particles,
radio-frequency transmissions, or a microwave generator. These
gizmos could burn a fatal hole in the satellite's skin, temporarily
and reversibly (or permanently) blind its sensors, or possibly em-
ploy cyber warfare to alter the satellite's on-board computers,
switching it off or even commandeering it for the attacker's own
uses.25
Along with these technologies, also under development are "co-
orbital" ASAT systems, which are effectively mini-satellites that
can be deployed by spacecraft and sent on missions to selectively
destroy other satellites.2 1 It is evident that countries are develop-
ing increasingly sophisticated means of denying an enemy's sat-
ellite technology.
D. THE X-37B ORBITAL TEST VEHICLE: SPACE-BASED
DRONE BOMBER?
In addition to ASAT weapons systems, the United States is al-
legedly actively developing a so-called space bomber.2 ' Dubbed
the X-37B Orbital Test Vehicle (OTV), the space bomber is offi-
cially an unmanned vertical-takeoff, horizontal-landing (VTHL),
24 Factsheet, U.S. AIR FORCE SPACE COMMAND (Apr. 29, 2013), http://www.afspc.
af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3649.
25 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1201. Therefore, because directed energy ASAT
systems do not destroy a satellite, they are described as non-kinetic-kill systems.
See id.
26 See Duncan Blake & Joseph S. Imburgia, "Bloodless Weapons"? The Need to Con-
duct Legal Reviews of Certain Capabilities and the Implications of Defining Them as
"Weapons", 66 A.F. L. REv. 157, 176 (2010).
27 See Burghardt, supra note 6.
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reusable spaceplane.2 8 While still under development, and likely
at least a decade from deployment, the X-37B first launched into
space aboard an Atlas V rocket in April 2010, "after more than
ten years of development by Boeing Corporation's 'Phantom
Works' black projects shop."29 The spaceplane is a quarter of the
size of the Space Shuttle and can stay aloft for nearly nine
months, deploying solar panels for power.so More importantly
for IHL, the spaceplane has a payload bay that might be able to
deploy and retrieve small co-orbital ASAT mini-satellites or any
number of weapons systems.3'
The very clandestine development of the X-37B suggests its
ultimate purpose is for missions beyond deploying co-orbital
ASAT satellites and delivering materials to the International
Space Station. Rather, as reported by the New York Times, ana-
lysts tracking the spaceplane noted its test flight trajectory
passed over "global trouble spots, including Iraq, Iran, Afghani-
stan, Pakistan, and North Korea"; thus, the X-37B may be part of
an experimental effort to develop sophisticated new surveillance
systems." The fact that the spaceplane was able to be publicly
tracked" once more emphasizes the reality that future space-
based weapons will operate from a level playing field-assuming
their development is allowed by the international community.
E. RECORDED ASAT TESTS
While the threat posed by ASAT weapons cannot be over-
stated, the number of recorded tests of ASAT weapons is unde-
niably low." As such, it is important not to create the false
perception of a "global ASAT arms race" or any other sort of
escalating scenario. As Koplow expresses, "Tests of satellite-kill-
ers in outer space have averaged approximately one per year
since the space age began, but the vast bulk of [ASAT tests] oc-
curred more than twenty-five years ago."" The end of the Cold
War brought an abrupt halt to the need for the active develop-
28 Id.; Is the X-37B Space Plane Spying on China?, MAG ISSUE (Jan. 6, 2012), http:/
/www.magissue.com/is-the-X-37b-space-plane-spying-on-china.html.
29 Burghardt, supra note 6.
30William J. Broad, Surveillance Suspected as Spacecraft's Main Role, N.Y. TIMES





34 SPACE SECURITY 2011, supra note 1, at 157.
3 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1235.
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ment of ASAT systems." However, the rapid rise of China as a
military and economic superpower over the last two decades is
bringing renewed focus on ASAT technology-militaries intend
to maintain a qualitative edge in the control of information, in-
telligence, and outer space itself.17 "Since 1985 . . . depending
on how one counts the ambiguous or incompletely documented
cases," the numbers of recorded tests are as follows:
* "[O]ne kinetic [missile] interceptor test in space by the
United States (in 2008)";
* "[O]ne high-energy laser ASAT test by the United States
(in 1997)";
* "[F]our interceptor tests by China (in 2005-2007)";
* "[T]wo or three directed energy ASAT events by China (in
2006)"; and
* "[N]o tests of either sort by the Soviet Union or Russia.
(There may have been additional instances of non-destruc-
tive tests that have not been publicly identified.)" 8
Critically, with respect to IHL, "no [s]tate has ever used its ASAT
system in hostilities or in a time of crisis against the spacecraft of
another country.""
F. THE THREAT OF SPACE DEBRIS
There is another significant reason so few ASAT tests have
been conducted: ASAT tests create hazardous debris in space.
Over 16,000 space objects-mostly junk and debris-are cur-
rently being tracked by the U.S. Strategic Command.4 0 In re-
sponse to this threat, "the U.S. government has promulgated
regulations for minimizing the creation of new orbital debris" in
its National Space Policy; at the same time, "the commercial
space industry has [started speaking] out against weapons tests
. . . that could unnecessarily litter space with [thousands of
pieces of] hazardous debris."4 1 The explosion of an ASAT mis-
36 Id. at 1208-09.
3 See Robert A. Ramey, Armed Conflict on the Final Frontier: The Law of War in
Space, 48 A.F. L. REv. 7, 141-43 (2000) (arguing that "[t]he space force structure
represents a major component of the information infrastructure and will become
increasingly important in deterring conflict and conducting future military
operations").
38 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1235.
3 Id.
- USSTRATCOM Space Control and Space Surveillance, U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND,
http://www.stratcom.mil/factsheets/USSTRATCOM-SpaceControland_
Space-Surveillance/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2013).
41 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1207-08.
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sile creates a significant amount of space debris in Earth's
orbit.4 2
An even more elemental assessment explains the central
problem with conducting ASAT tests: "space debris does not dis-
criminate" when it comes into contact with satellites.4 3 Koplow
explains: "Traveling at enormous orbital velocities (30,000 km/
hr in low orbit), a chunk of random debris could obliterate an
unlucky satellite."4 4 American satellites are thus just as vulnera-
ble to impact from debris caused by an American ASAT test as
Chinese and Russian satellites.4 ' Emphasizing the threat of
space debris, in November 2011, astronauts aboard the Interna-
tional Space Station were nearly forced to enter the Soyuz escape
capsule as a protection measure when debris from China's 2007
ASAT test passed "within a half-mile" of the international or-
biter.4 6 This close encounter also highlights the anthropogenic
tragedy of space junk contaminating Earth's orbit.
G. RISE OF GROUND-BASED "DIRECTED ENERGY," NON-KINETIC-
KILL ASAT SYSTEMS
While the lethality of space debris has discouraged ASAT mis-
sile tests, countries are not about to abandon ASAT weapons sys-
tems altogether; instead, many are actively developing ground-
based laser "directed energy," non-kinetic-kill ASAT systems.4 7
These laser systems are designed to negate the surveillance capa-
bilities of satellites without destroying them, so the laser systems
avoid the creation of space debris." Air Force Undersecretary
for Space Programs Gary Payton has explicitly "rejected [kinetic-
kill] space weapons [such as ASAT missiles], stating that '[i]t
would be hugely disadvantageous for the U.S. to get into that
game.' "49Laser systems have reportedly been tested by China,
42 Id. at 1202-03.
4 International Space Law Panel, 11 WHITEHEAD J. DIPLOMACY & INT'L REL. 7, 9
(2010).
" Koplow, supra note 4, at 1202.
4 International Space Law Panel, supra note 43, at 25.
46 Brian Vastag, Debris Passes by Space Station Without Forcing Astronauts to Seek
Shelter, WASH. POST (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/
health-science/astronauts-may-need-to-shelter-in-place-as-debris-nears-space-sta-
tion/2011/11/22/gQANAuCmN-story.html?hpid=z3.
4 SPACE SECURITY 2011, supra note 1, at 25.
- See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, SPACE CONTROL TECHNOLOGY, 0603438F, at 517
(2004), http://www.dtic.mil/descriptivesum/Y2005/AirForce/0603438F.pdf (Air
Force RDT&E Budget Item Justification Sheet).
4 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1208.
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and these tests have included varying power levels to cause elec-
tronic disruption, minor surface damage, or significant electro-
magnetic damage to enemy satellite technology-all without
firing a missile into space.o In contrast to ASAT missiles, which
are obvious when launched, provocative in nature, and have the
potential to be intercepted, ground-based laser ASAT systems
are stealthy, nonintrusive, and, critically, do not create space
debris. Their use is contentious nonetheless.
V. SOURCES OF LAW
With this background information, it is essential to assess the
status of international treaty law and IHL as they relate to the
weaponization of space.
A. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
The Outer Space Treaty (OST), formally the Treaty on Princi-
ples Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, was entered into force on October 10, 1967, and forms
the basis of international space law.5' To date, 102 countries are
parties to the treaty, while another 26 have signed the treaty but
have not completed ratification. Writing in the Harvard Law
and Policy Review, author Joanne Gabrynowicz notes that "[i]t
was a scant ten months from the end of Outer Space Treaty ne-
gotiations to its entrance into force in 1967. . . . The speed with
which the international community established this treaty re-
gime demonstrates a clear intent that space was to be governed by
international law."" This is an important consideration with re-
spect to this article's proposed international ban on ASAT mis-
sile systems and space weapons, set out later.
Among the OST's principles, state parties to the OST are
barred from placing nuclear weapons or any other WMDs in or-
bit around Earth, installing them on the Moon or any other ce-
50 See id. at 1213.
51 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8.
52 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies (Outer Space Treaty), Nu-
CLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE, http://www.nti.org/treaties-and-regimes/treaty-princi-
ples-governing-activities-states-exploration-and-use-outer-space-including-moon-
and-other-celestial-bodies-outer-space-treaty/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2013).
53 Joanne Irene Gabrynowicz, One Half Century and Counting: The Evolution of
U.S. National Space Law and Three Long-Term Emerging Issues, 4 HARv. L. & PoL'Y
REv. 405, 422 (2010) (emphasis added).
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lestial body, or otherwise stationing them in outer space. 4 The
treaty further provides that "[o]uter space ... shall be free for
exploration and use by all [s]tates without discrimination";5 5
that "[o]uter space ... is not subject to national appropriation
by claim of sovereignty . .. or by any other means" ;56 and that
"[s] tates. .. shall carry on their activities in the exploration and
use of outer space . . . in accordance with international law, in-
cluding the Charter of the United Nations."5
Notably, the OST does not prevent the stationing of conven-
tional weapons (including conventional ASAT weapons) in
space.58 Article IV implies that the OST does not "affect a nu-
clear weapon that makes only a temporary transit of outer space,
as when propelled by an intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) toward its target, rather than being 'stationed' in
space."5' However, as Major Bellflower notes in the Air Force Law
Review, the "peaceful purposes" phrase in Article IV "engenders
considerable debate over whether it should be interpreted to
refer to 'non-military' or 'non-aggressive or non-hostile.' The
United States has consistently taken the latter position."6 0 Ulti-
mately, the OST only bans weapons activities on the Moon and
leaves unrestricted any imaginable non-nuclear activity (includ-
ing weapons tests) in the space around Earth. It is noteworthy
that it took a full ten years after the launch of Sputnik 1 for the
international community to establish a treaty for the preserva-
tion of outer space.6 2 With that said, Koplow notes that "many of
the treaty's provisions, including most of the key 'constitutional'
postulates that characterize the realm, had likely been estab-
lished as [customary international law] well before 1967";
Koplow references successive United Nations (U.N.) General As-
sembly Resolutions on rules for the use outer space, such as the
1963 Outer Space Declaration. 3
54 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, art. IV.
55 Id. art. I.
56 Id. art. II.
57 Id. art. III.
58 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1198.
59 Id.
60 John W. Bellflower, The Influence of Law on Command of Space, 65 A.F. L. REv.
107, 128 (2010) (quoting Michael N. Schmitt, International Law and Military Oper-
ations in Space, 10 U.N.Y.B. 89, 101 (2006)).
61 See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 8, arts. I-IV.
62 See Gabrynowicz, supra note 53, at 405 (noting that the OST entered into
force in 1967).
63 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1233-35.
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B. THE SPACE PRESERVATION TREATY
The Space Preservation Treaty (SPT) was presented to the
U.N. in 2006 and sought to place a ban on all weapons and war-
fare in space. 4 The proposed treaty built on a 2001 U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution that declared:
[T]he exploration and use of outer space ... shall be for peace-
ful purposes and shall be carried out for the benefit and in the
interest of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic
or scientific development . . . . [The] prevention of an arms race
in outer space would avert a grave danger for international peace
and security.65
However,
[t]hree countries, most notably the United States of America, ab-
stained from voting on most provisions of [the SPT] because the
proposed treaty [allegedly] did not do enough to clearly define
what is meant by a "space weapon," and therefore was open to
wide interpretation and impossible to verify whether it was being
violated."
Discussed under the banner of the "Prevention of an Arms Race
in Outer Space," the SPT was never ratified.6 7 The SPT is repre-
sentative of the difficulty likely to be encountered by a proposed
treaty to ban ASAT weapons systems.
C. U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POLICY IN 2010 vs. 2006
Accordingly, the United States' current National Space Policy
(as of 2010) does not explicitly preclude the development of
weapons for use in space. The policy declares that:
The United States will employ a variety of measures to help as-
sure the use of space for all responsible parties, and, consistent
with the inherent right of self-defense, deter others from inter-
ference and attack, defend our space systems and contribute to the de-
fense of allied space systems, and, if deterrence fails, defeat efforts to
attack them."
64 Rangam Sharma & Sukhvinder Singh Dari, Conflicting Sovereignty Issue in
Outer Space: An Analysis of the Current Existing Conventions Vis a Vis Impediments and
Challenges, 1 INT'L ORG. Sci. RES. J. HuMANITIES & Soc. ScI. 14, 17 (2012).
65 G.A. Res. 55/32, U.N. Doc. A/RES/5532 (Jan. 3, 2001).
66 Sharma & Dari, supra note 64, at 17.
67 G.A. Res. 61/58, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/58 (Jan. 3, 2001).
6 OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SPACE POLICY OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 3 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. NATIONAL SPACE POL-
Icy 2010] (emphasis added).
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This policy of "self-defense" would presumably include the right
of the United States to shoot down enemy satellites or space-
based weapons systems that threaten American space systems
and satellites, and would arguably justify the use of ASAT weap-
ons systems.
The Obama Administration's policy contrasts the space policy
set out during the Bush Administration, which declared the
following:
The United States considers space capabilities-including the
ground and space segments and supporting links-vital to its na-
tional interests. Consistent with this policy, the United States will:
preserve its rights, capabilities, and freedom of action in space;
dissuade or deter others from either impeding those rights or
developing capabilities intended to do so; take those actions nec-
essary to protect its space capabilities; respond to interference;
and deny, if necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to
U.S. national interests.69
Presumably, the Bush Administration's policy could have also
deemed foreign satellites to be potentially "hostile to U.S. na-
tional interests," thus justifying the use of ASAT systems. 0 Ar-
guably, the world's foremost satellite superpower has a
significant national interest in protecting its 450+ satellites in
orbit. 71
VI. INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
ASAT WEAPONS
Until now, this article has focused on providing an objective
assessment of ASAT weapons, including their development,
types, and use, as well as the general law of outer space. All of
this ties to the primary argument of this article and serves to
frame an assessment of how IHL applies to ASAT weapons. This
analysis is particularly relevant given that ASAT weapons have
not been employed in combat to date. Through an assessment
of IHL, it will become clear that the use of ASAT weapons and
space-based drone bombers will negatively impact the applica-
tion of IHL by reducing the ability of states to assess the propor-
tionality, distinction, and military necessity of such attacks in the
69 OFFICE OF Sci. & TECH. POLICY, ExEc. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, U.S. NA-
TIONAL SPACE POLICY (2006) (emphasis added), available at http://www.fas.org/
irp/offdocs/nspd/space.pdf.
70 See id.
71 UCS Satellite Database, supra note 18.
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event of war. It is necessary, then, to critically analyze principles
of IHL in order to appreciate this argument.
A. ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE GENEVA CONVENTION
Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Convention (Protocol I)
seeks "to reaffirm and develop the provisions [of the Geneva
Convention] protecting the victims of armed conflicts."72 Proto-
col I is the premier source of IHL within which ASAT weapons
and space-based drone bombers can be assessed. Further, un-
derstanding how Protocol I applies will show how ASAT weap-
onry, when used in conjunction with coordinated cyber-attacks,
has the potential to rapidly cripple vital civilian infrastructure
and thus harm civilian populations, breaching various sections
of Protocol I.
B. ARTICLE 35: "BASIC RULES"-UNLIMITED SPACE WARFARE?
Foremost, Article 35 of Protocol I establishes the "[b]asic
rules" of armed conflict, and subsection 1 establishes that "the
right of the [p]arties to the conflict to choose methods or
means of warfare is not unlimited."7 3 Moreover, of particular rel-
evance to ASAT weapons is subsection 2, which sets out that
states are "prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and mate-
rial and methods of warfare of a nature to cause superfluous
injury or unnecessary suffering." 7 The use of ASAT weapons in
warfare would potentially constitute a violation of Article 35. If a
state were to launch a full-scale, successful ASAT attack on an
enemy's satellite network today, such an attack would also likely
have a crippling effect on that country's civilian population.
This attack would arguably breach Article 35(1) and (2) of Pro-
tocol I because (1) nearly every major civilian communication
system today is dependent on satellites, and (2) many satellites
serve both civilian and military purposes, bringing Article 52 of
Protocol I into consideration as well (assessed later). In sum,
the consequences of a "simple" ASAT attack could potentially
open up the prospect of "unlimited" warfare-the type of war-
fare sought to be barred under Article 35(1).76 Furthermore,
the offensive targeting of a country's complete satellite system
72 Protocol I, supra note 7.
73 Id. art. 35(1).
74 Id. art. 35(2).
75 See id. art. 52.
76 See id. art. 35(1).
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could lead to a Cold War-era type of nuclear exchange. Given
the likelihood of widespread damage, it is evident that a country
attacked with ASAT weapons would have difficulty calculating a
proportional response; if the scope or necessity of a response is
miscalculated, this could create further instability.
To further understand this argument, consider the fact that
modern society has exponentially increased its dependence on
cell phones, GPS, and the internet, and therefore has developed
a disproportionate dependence on the wireless technology that
is facilitated by satellite communications, particularly in the de-
veloping world." Attacks that target vital satellite communica-
tions systems could quite literally revert decades of progress in
these developing countries. As such, even the successful destruc-
tion of a small percentage of a nation's satellite infrastructure
could prove catastrophic for the basic functioning of a country
because it would take years, if not decades, to restore the same
satellite communications capacity assembled over many years of
expensive satellite launches.
C. HYPOTHETICAL: U.S.-CHINA ASAT MISSILE EXCHANGE
OVER TAIwAN
To help illustrate this point, consider the following hypotheti-
cal conflict. In the event of a conflict between the United States
and China concerning Taiwan, it is possible that one of the most
effective means of disadvantaging the enemy would be to com-
pletely destroy or disable its military communications system
and cellular networks provided by satellites. The United States
would seek to disable Chinese surveillance satellites over Tai-
wan, and similarly, China would seek to destroy the United
States' surveillance and targeting capabilities. Disabling an en-
emy's GPS would nullify the targeting capabilities of numerous
missile systems and greatly inhibit the ability to locate both
friend and foe on the battlefield. It is also important to recog-
nize that the use of ASAT systems in full-scale war would likely
form just one component in an attack designed to cripple na-
tional infrastructure; the attack would also probably include
cyber-attacks78 designed to simultaneously destroy other essen-
77 See INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, MEASURING THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 1-4
(2011), available at http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/publications/idi/201 1/Mate-
rial/MIS_2011_without annex_5.pdf; Koplow, supra note 4, at 1190.
78 SeeJim Bronskill, Ottawa Warned About Hackers Weeks Before Crippling Cyber At-
tack: CSIS Report, GLOBE & MAIL (Oct. 30, 2011), http://www.theglobeandmail.
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tial pieces of communications infrastructure. The use of ASAT
systems in war would likely have a cascading, destabilizing effect
on the global order. In the context of IHL, a successful attack
that damages or destroys a country's communications systems
would make it technologically and logistically difficult for that
country to assess the circumstances surrounding the enemy's
ASAT strike. This would make it extremely difficult to determine
the appropriate scope of a military response.
D. ARTICLE 36: "NEw WEAPONS"
While ASAT weapons are not technically "new" weapons sys-
tems, the threat posed by the potential proliferation of ASAT
systems is greater than ever due to global dependence on satel-
lite communications systems. Moreover, the reality that many
other countries (such as China) are actively developing ASAT
capabilities raises concerns about the consequences of the use
of ASAT weapons during warfare." Article 36 of Protocol I es-
tablishes rules for "the study, development, acquisition or adop-
tion of a new weapon, means or method of warfare," and
specifically makes clear that countries are "under an obligation
to determine whether [a new weapon's] employment would, in
some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by
any other rule of international law applicable to the High Con-
tracting Party."80 This "new weapons" provision is contentious
with respect to IHL because of the absence in international law
of an explicit prohibition on the weaponization of space. As
such, the development and forward deployment of ASAT weap-
ons systems today could contravene Article 36, given the pres-
ently unregulated standards on ASAT weaponry. The pressing
need (assessed later) is for the international community to es-
tablish a treaty prohibiting the use of ASAT weapons-a treaty
similar in nature to the chemical weapons ban-in order to out-
law the use of offensive ASAT weapons systems.
One aspect of ASAT weapon use that may fall under the pur-
view of Article 36 is the ongoing development of ground-based
laser ASAT systems, which have yet to be deployed in any known
capacity."' As such, if a country possesses both missile and laser
corn/ news/ national/ottawa-warned-about-hackers-weeks-before-crippling-cyber-
attack-csis-report/article22 19129/.
79 See Sands, supra note 10.
so Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 36.
81 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1235-36.
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ASAT systems, and both are equally effective at performing an
ASAT mission, then the country should employ a "'necessity'
standard [to] help dictate the choice between them. Specifi-
cally, if a laser ASAT is available, and is equally effective, then
employment of the [missile-based] interceptor technology"
(which creates hazardous space debris) "is no longer 'neces-
sary.' "82 Koplow succinctly notes, "Where a State can effectively
neutralize an enemy's satellite via mechanisms that do not im-
pose the persistent debris harm to the peaceful space activities
of future generations of civilians and neutral States, . . . custom-
ary [IHL] would outlaw use of an interceptor."8 3
E. DISTINCTION: ARTICLE 48 AND ARTICLE 52(2): "GENERAL
PROTECTION AGAINST EFFECTS OF HOSTILITIES" AND "ATTACKS
MUST BE LIMITED TO MILITARY OBJECTIVES"
Article 48 of Protocol I establishes the "General Protection" of
the civilian population against the effects of hostilities, requiring
that "[p]arties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish . . .
between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly
shall direct their operations only against military objectives."8 4
Because many civilian satellites can be "retained" for military
objectives at the request of a government, such as in 2001 when
the U.S. government purchased all commercial satellite imagery
over Afghanistan to supplement its own spy surveillance, 5 the
lines between civilian and military objectives are blurry when it
comes to satellites. This unclear distinction makes adherence to
Article 52(2) of Protocol I exceptionally difficult when a state
considers deploying ASAT weapons." Article 52(2) makes ex-
plicit that:
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as ob-
jects are concerned, military objectives are limited to those ob-
jects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an
effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial
destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances rul-
ing at the time, offers a definite military. . . advantage.8 7
82 Id. at 1248.
83 Id.
84 Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 48.
85 David Whitehouse, US Buys Afghan Image Rights, BBC NEWs (Oct. 17, 2011),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1604426.stm.
86 See Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 52(2).
87 Id. (emphasis added).
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However, in practice, the unclear distinction between civilian
and military objectives may result in the creation of a deterrent
effect against the use of ASAT weapons. Indeed, during the last
few wars involving major powers-the 1991 Gulf War, the 2001
War in Afghanistan, the 2003 Iraq War, and Russia's 2008 War
in South Ossetia-satellites were not targeted for attack. 8 How-
ever, in those cases, the major power's "one-sided technological
edge[ ] obviated any reason to exercise weapons in space," and
moreover, the "asymmetrical nature of each country's military
assets and vulnerabilities provided little occasion to shoot at ob-
jects in space."" Nonetheless, the targeting of satellites that are
used exclusively for military purposes can be theoretically justi-
fied under Article 52," potentially leading to increased instabil-
ity during combat.
In explaining how an ASAT attack may be justified, Koplow
notes that the laws of armed conflict "[do] not prohibit all 'col-
lateral damage' harm to civilians-that would probably be an
impossible goal in any realistic military engagement-but it is
axiomatic that force may lawfully be directed only at military
objectives."" With respect to ASAT weapons, Koplow nonethe-
less emphasizes that a "weapon system that is inherently incapa-
ble of that degree of finesse . . . is illegal,"9 such as a chemical
weapon. Such weaponry has been banned because the user of
the weapon cannot control "or even reliably predict" where the
effects of the weapon may be felt; it thus fails to meet the stan-
dards set out in Protocol 1.9 In contrast, an ASAT weapon is
quite discriminating and "is aimed with exquisite precision at a
specific enemy satellite."' Indeed, "a whole [barrage] of ASATs
would be steered by the most sophisticated guidance systems to
[target] particular hostile spacecraft one by one."9 5 This preci-
sion makes their utility more valuable in the eyes of military
planners seeking to adhere to IHL.
88 See Koplow, supra note 4, at 1236.
89 Id.
90 See Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 52.
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F. ARTICLE 51: "PROTECTION OF THE CIVILLAN POPULATION"
Article 51 establishes that "civilians shall enjoy [the] general
protection against dangers arising from military operations."9 6
While this article generally applies to ground warfare and the
threats posed by indiscriminate aerial bombardment, it can be
argued that attacks on civilian satellites would represent an indi-
rect targeting of civilian populations by disrupting components
vital to life. Any sort of coordinated ASAT attack on cellular
communications satellites would likely shut down emergency
services and everyday business operations, and lead to a loss of
life. The threat to civilians is made even greater in the event that
ASAT attacks are launched alongside massive cyber-attacks that
target other vital national infrastructure.
Koplow stresses that countries must consider the potential
harm to civilians and the proportionality of the attack before
utilizing ASAT weapons in combat." With respect to IHL, he
notes that "an ASAT operation-especially one that might
spawn a persistent debris hazard-is vulnerable under this analy-
sis."98 However, before launching an ASAT operation, the "pro-
portionality calculus" of military strategists would be intrinsically
complicated by the fact that the military value of enemy satellites
would be very high.99 This is true given the reality that "a [mod-
ern] enemy force is heavily reliant on its satellites for reconnais-
sance, communications, [and] targeting" systems. 10 0 Moreover,
for weaker nations with lesser satellite capabilities, such as Iran,
Koplow suggests that if these countries possess "few alternative
'fallback' substitutes, then destruction of one (or a few) orbiters
could carry a significant premium" for the aggressor employing
ASAT weapons."o' This reality makes the military necessity of
ASAT weapon use particularly compelling in the heat of combat.
G. ARTICLE 56: "PROTECTION OF WORKS AND INSTALLATIONS
CONTAINING DANGEROUS FORCES"
In February 2008, the United States used a sea-launched
ASAT missile to shoot down a non-functioning U.S. National Re-
connaissance Office (NRO) satellite named USA-193, whose or-
96 Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 51.
97 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1246-47.
98 Id. at 1246.
99 Id.
1oo Id.
101 Id. at 1246-47.
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bit was decaying by approximately 500 meters per day.1 12 The
U.S. government claimed that the primary reason for destroying
the satellite was the approximately 1,000 pounds (450 kilo-
grams) of toxic hydrazine fuel contained on board; officials
were concerned about the resulting health and environmental
risks' 03 posed to persons in the immediate vicinity of the crash
site should any significant amount survive re-entry into Earth's
atmosphere.o10 Though critics allege that this American ASAT
test was simply a response to China's 2007 ASAT test and had
nothing to do with the threat posed to humans,1 0 5 the test high-
lights the responsibilities of countries set out under Article 56 of
Protocol I.1o6 Article 56 lists strategic sites that contain "danger-
ous forces" that "shall not be made the object of attack, . . . if
such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and con-
sequent severe losses among the civilian population."10 7
Though the threat of large civilian losses on the ground
caused by ASAT attacks is likely minimal due to the fact that
most satellite debris stays in orbit or burns up during re-entry,
the reality is that satellites like USA-193 are constructed out of
toxic materials and pose an environmental threat upon being
shot down over civilian populations. This is even truer when
satellites are shot down in significant numbers during a full-scale
ASAT attack intended to completely annihilate an enemy's satel-
lite capacity. Given that Article 57 of Protocol I also requires
states to take precautions to spare civilians before attacking,108
IHL stresses the need to consider all the implications of ASAT
strikes.
102 Angela Webb, Joint Effort Made Satellite Success Possible, U.S. AIR FORCE (Feb.
26, 2008), http://www.af.mil/news/articledisplay/tabid/223/article/124266/
joint-effort-made-satellite-success-possible.aspx; see U.S. Spy Satellite, Power Gone,
May Hit Earth, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/
27/us/27spy.html?em&cr=o.
10 Suman Chowdhury, Space Wars: Beginning of a New Era, BRAHMAND.COM
(Nov. 18, 2010), http://www.brahmand.com/news/space-wars-beginning-of-a-
new-era/5524/3/15.html; see also Webb, supra note 102.
104 See Chowdhury, supra note 103.
105 Id.
106 See Protocol I, supra note 7, art. 56.
107 Id.
108 Id. art. 57.
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VII. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BAN ON
CHEMICAL WARFARE
The integral nature of satellites to modern life, the potential
destabilizing effect of ASAT weapon use, and the unavoidable
threat of space debris collectively legitimize a push toward a
global ban on the use of ASAT weapons and space-based drone
bombers. The precedent for such a ban has been set out by the
Chemical Weapons Convention, 109 which is an important com-
parative analysis tool in considering a potential ban on conven-
tional weapons in space. For decades, "[c] hemical weapons have
been researched, developed, tested, manufactured, deployed,
used, and retired by many countries in diverse settings," despite
the fact that "public opinion has always recoiled [at the prospect
of] chemical warfare.""'0
Some of the earliest arms control treaties, including the Brus-
sels Declaration of 1874111 and the Hague Conventions of
1899112 and 1907,113 were developed with these hated weapons
in mind. By 1925, the Geneva Protocol achieved consensus on
chemical weapons, with the parties declaring that
the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases. . . has
been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized
world . . . [to the end] that this prohibition shall be universally
accepted as a part of International Law, binding alike the con-
science and the practice of nations.'
The Chemical Weapons Convention, which entered into force
in 1997,115 was the culmination of decades of efforts to ban
chemical weapons. But prior to that time, customary intedrna-
109 See Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stock-
piling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. I, Jan. 13,
1993, 1974 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter Chemical Weapons Convention].
110 Koplow, supra note 4, at 12587.
III Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War (Aug. 27, 1874), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/135.
112 Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1803.
113 Annex to the Convention Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land art. 23(a), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 ("[I]t is especially forbidden
... [t]o employ poison or poisoned weapons.").
114 Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous
or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, pmbl., June 17, 1925,
26 U.S.T. 571.
15 Chemical Weapons Convention, supra note 109, at 317 n.1.
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tional law had long established that chemical weapons were an
especially horrific form of warfare, with numerous statements
and resolutions from the U.N. General Assembly attesting to
this.'16 Similarly, existing opposition to ASAT weapons and the
weaponization of space could lead to the development of an
ASAT and Space Weapons Ban. However, unlike chemical weap-
ons, which merely comprised a type of ground weaponry that
was obviously detrimental to basic human health interests, space
weapons represent not only a new type of weaponry but also the
vanguard of an entirely new theater of warfare. The feasibility of
a space weapons ban may hinge on whether countries are will-
ing to cede the exoatmospheric realm to the international
collective.
B. FEASIBILITY OF AN "ANTI-SATELLITE AND SPACE
WEAPONS BAN"
Although a public revulsion to space weaponry may not exist
in the same way that it does for chemical weapons, given the
"bloodless" and largely experimental nature of space weap-
onry,"' there are many reasons to believe that an "ASAT and
Space Weapons Ban" may be a feasible international pursuit.
Foremost, as established earlier in this article, the universal, in-
discriminate threat of space debris created by ASAT explosions
gives every country on Earth reason to oppose the potential
weaponization of space. The accordant potential for widespread
harm to civilian populations resulting from the destruction of
satellites is a tangible global issue-one which could be persua-
sively argued in the appropriate international fora.
Second, the relative ease with which space-based weapons can
be tracked by enemy powers, as evidenced by the publicly
tracked U.S. X-37B "space bomber" test,""s makes their useful-
ness marginal in comparison to more stealthy, non-space-based
Air Force alternatives. While the qualitative military advantage
offered by space-based weapons to the major military powers is
undeniable, countries like the United States recognize that
"arming the atmosphere" will likely lead to rival powers doing
the same; these actions could easily escalate into a new arms
116 Question of Chemical and Bacteriological (Biological) Weapons, G.A. Res.
2603 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A/RES/
2603(XXIV), at 16 (Dec. 16, 1969).
117 Blake & Imburgia, supra note 26, at 159-60.
118 See Broad, supra note 30.
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race and destabilize the planet.'" Finally, in the event of war,
the reciprocal nature of an offensive ASAT missile exchange,
combined with the immense costs and significant length of time
needed to place new satellites in orbit, represents an intractable
barrier toward the active deployment of ASAT systems
internationally.
C. PARALLELS BETWEEN THE CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN AND A
POTENTIAL SPACE WEAPONS BAN
"The parallels between the chemical weapons [ban effort] in
the twentieth century and the ASAT case in the twenty-first cen-
tury are striking." 20 Koplow comprehensively details these paral-
lels in his article on ASATs:
* [A] widely reviled weapon had earned significant interna-
tional opprobrium, with experts and the knowledgeable pub-
lic considering that form of combat to be shortsighted and
reprehensible;
* [S]imultaneously, the weapons were recognized as powerful,
potentially decisive in combat, or at least capable of greatly
disrupting a country's planned military activities (and, per-
haps, the weapons seemed to confer more advantage on an
offensive attacker, with less utility for a defender);
* [T]he weapons had proliferated and threatened to spread
further (while at the same time, the leading military powers
(the United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, and in the case
of ASAT, China) possessed by far the greatest inventories, ex-
perience, and capacity);
* [T]he weapons were extremely imprecise and indiscriminate,
with effects spreading unpredictably far from the intended
targets, irresponsibly afflicting civilians and neutrals alike;
* [T]he effects of the weapons were notoriously persistent
(some [chemical weapons] linger on, and around, the battle-
field for a worrisome length of time-but nothing like the
decades of danger posed by ASATs).121
It is therefore reasonable to believe that an ASAT and Space
Weapons Ban is an achievable international objective. The hesi-
11 STEVEN M. KosIAK, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS, ARMING
THE HEAVENS: A PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT OF THE POTENTIAL COST AND CosT-EF-
FEcTIVENESS OF SPACE-BASED WEAPONS 3 (Oct. 31, 2007), available at http://www.
csbaonline.org/publications/2007/10/arming-the-heavens-a-preliminary-assess-
men t-of-the-potential-cost-and-cost-effectiveness-of-space-based-weapons/2/.
120 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1262.
121 Id.
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tancy of countries to further test ASAT missile systems due to the
space debris created also lends weight behind a push to ban
these weapons altogether.
D. ASAT AND SPACE WEAPONS BAN DISCUSSIONS To DATE
The United States recently entered into discussions with the
European Union toward the development of an "agreement lim-
iting the use of anti-satellite weapons," with the joint primary
concern being the prevention of further debris creation in
space.12 However, apart from perennial non-binding U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolutions toward the "Prevention of an Arms
Race in Outer Space,"' 2 there is no global movement toward a
ban on the weaponization of space. As Koplow notes, part of the
problem is "the sheer complexity of the issues, the multiplicity
of national and commercial interests at play, and the range of
competing priorities occupying negotiators' attentions. "124 An-
other major hurdle "has been the persistent inability of leading
authorities in Washington, D.C. and Moscow to decide whether
a system of mutual restraint, or a strategy of unilateral advan-
tage-seeking, offers a better approach to security in space."' 25
With that said, these challenges should not be viewed as insur-
mountable hurdles because the success of the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention today emphasizes the ability of states to
overcome differences in the pursuit of the greater good.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The use of ASAT weaponry in combat and the potential use of
space-based drone bombers threaten to contravene IHL, cause
widespread harm to civilian populations, and thus escalate con-
flicts; as such, the use of ASAT weapons should be treated like
the use of WMDs. Given the nearly unstoppable advance of
modern military technology, if space weapons are not banned,
countries will be forced to build satellites equipped with coun-
termeasures that destroy incoming ASAT missiles and, as a con-
sequence, effectively guarantee the permanent weaponization of
122 US., EU Eye Anti-Satellite Weapons Pact, WASH. TIMES (Jan. 27, 2011), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/201 1/jan/27/us-eu-eye-anti-satellite-weapons-
pact/?page=all.
123 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 63/40, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/40 (Dec. 2, 2008); G.A. Res.
61/58, supra note 67; G.A. Res. 55/32, supra note 65.
.124 Koplow, supra note 4, at 1215.
125 Id. at 1215-16.
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space.126 At that point, there exists only a small leap in logic
between the prospects of satellites armed with missiles for self-
defense to satellites (or space-bombers/orbiters) armed with mis-
siles and bombs for offensive purposes. Further, the potential
widespread use of stealthy ground-based ASAT lasers threatens
to disrupt national satellite communications networks, which in
turn threatens to cause massive civilian losses in war.
In summary, the weaponization of space offers a bleaker fu-
ture, represents an abuse of modern technology, and steps un-
necessarily into -the unknown for all countries. International
legal norms provide more-than-sufficient precedents for the cre-
ation of an "ASAT and Space Weapons Ban," as the assessment
of the Chemical Weapons Convention exemplified. Weapons in
space must be contained because the potential for disaster is
enormous. Humanity's beneficial use of space has become too
entrenched to passively allow weapons that in an instant could
erase decades of peaceful development and coexistence.
126 But see LAuRA GREco, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTs, SHORT HISTORY OF
US AND SOVIET ASAT PROGRAMs 8 (2003), available at http://www.ucsusa.org/
assets/documents/nwgs/asat-history.pdf.
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